




Dangerous Liaisons: a ‘Big Four’ 
framework that provides a ‘hint’ to 
understanding an adversary’s 
strategy for influence 
 
by Verrall, N., Dunkley, M., Gane, T. and Byrne, R. 
 
 
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: This material is licensed under the 
terms of the Open Government Licence 3.0 except where otherwise stated: 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/  
 

















© Crown copyright Vol. 164, No. 3, April 2019 pp. 52–68
This article emerged from a colloquium on ‘the will to fight’, an event held at the UK’s Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2018 
by Specialist Group Military Intelligence, a unit of 
specialist expert reserve personnel within the British 
Army. Audience members and presenters came from 
technical, academic and professional backgrounds 
across the arts, humanities and social sciences to 
discuss how national myths, places and icons could 
impact the will to fight (or not to fight). Emerging 
from two days of presentations and discussion was 
a high-level, four-factor theoretical framework. 
This framework interconnected four superordinate 
constructs: cultural heritage (H); iconoclasm (I); 
narratives (N); and socio-political timing (T).
According to NATO doctrine, ‘influence’ is 
defined as ‘the capacity to have an effect on the 
character or behaviour of someone or something, 
or the effect itself’.1 Information Activities (IA) are 
a subset of influence and are defined as ‘[a]ctions 
designed to affect information and/or information 
systems. Information activities can be performed 
by any actor and include protection measures’.2 
1. NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations’, AJP-3.10, December 2015, p. 1-2. The definition quoted is from
the Concise Oxford English Dictionary.
2. Ibid., Lexicon-6.
3. Ibid., Lexicon-6. The definition quoted is from NATO, ‘NATO Military Policy on Information Operations’, MC 422/4, 2012.
4. Robert B Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, revised edition (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2007).
5. Susan Michie et al., ABC of Behaviour Change Theories (Sutton: Silverback Publishing, 2014).
6. James Pamment et al., Countering Information Influence Activities: The State of the Art (Lund: Lund University, 2018).
Within IA are Information Operations (IO), which 
are ‘a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and 
integrate information activities to create desired 
effects on the will, understanding and capability of 
adversaries, potential adversaries and NAC [North 
Atlantic Council] approved audiences in support of 
Alliance mission objectives’.3 Therefore, influence, 
IA and IO work in concert, and are predominantly 
underpinned by knowledge from psychology and the 
social sciences.
Much of the underpinning knowledge explaining 
the mechanisms of persuasion and influence has 
focused on models, such as Robert Cialdini’s six 
principles of persuasion,4 or the compendium 
of behaviour change theories,5 or reference 
documents.6 This research, and associated insights, 
tend to sit within distinct academic disciplines such 
as psychology, sociology, anthropology, behavioural 
economics or human geography, and as such they 
tend to focus on specific behavioural constructs 
and phenomena. All of this subconsciously focuses 
attention downward to the tactical delivery of 
influence for activities such as leaflet drops, radio 
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broadcasts, television programmes, music, posters, 
graffiti, key leader engagement, and presence, 
posture and profile. One explanation for this 
focus on the tactical is that the military likes to be 
proactive and be seen to act, and because it does 
not tend to have behavioural science subject matter 
experts in uniform and in specific roles, it can more 
easily deliver relatively simplistic activities than have 
a higher and deeper appreciation of behavioural 
strategy; therefore, less emphasis has been placed 
on understanding and articulating the higher-level 
and interdisciplinary processes that may provide 
insights into influence as a strategy. Furthermore, 
an interdisciplinary approach that uses insights 
from the arts and humanities as well as the sciences 
(especially the psychological and social sciences) 
will provide a more rounded and considered 
appreciation and understanding of how beliefs, 
attitudes and observable behaviour can be shaped, 
motivated and expressed. Once one ponders the arts 
and humanities and their provision of understanding 
7. Arts and Humanities Research Council and UK Research and Innovation, ‘Delivery Plan 2019’, 2019.
8. Eric V Larson et al., Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities 
(Arlington, VA: RAND, 2009).
9. Clifford T Howard, ‘Influence Operations in Insurgencies: Identifying Framing Strategies for Special Warfare’, master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2014.
10. Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017).
11. Eric V Larson et al., Understanding Commanders’ Information Needs for Influence Operations (Arlington, VA: RAND, 
2009); Christopher Paul, ‘Enhancing US Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade’, Parameters (Vol. 46, No. 3, Autumn 
2016), pp. 88–97.
and behavioural expression, an interesting, expansive 
and inclusive model of influence begins to take 
shape. This is evident within the latest Delivery Plan 
from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council, 
which highlights issues such as understanding 
cultural value, languages in war, interdisciplinarity 
for contemporary challenges, and how to improve 
the reciprocal relations between science and the 
arts and humanities.7
It is assumed that better appreciation of social 
and cultural variables is important for contemporary 
warfare, especially given the lessons identified from 
recent counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, a review of published reports 
on the foundations,8 framing strategies,9 lessons,10 
and future needs11 of influence and information 
operations shows that there is a distinct absence of 
the requirement for higher-level understanding on 
topics such as heritage, iconoclasm, socio-political 
timing and compelling stories (narratives), although 
the term ‘narrative’ has become increasingly popular 
The Great Mosque of Al-Nuri in Mosul after its 
destruction by Daesh, December 2018. Courtesy of PA 
Images/Khalil Dawood
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and regularly used since the late 2000s. To illustrate 
this point, Table 1 presents a keyword search of 
relevant influence-related doctrine, which finds 
no mention of the words ‘heritage’, ‘iconoclasm’ or 
‘socio-political timing’, but numerous mentions of 
‘narrative(s)’. One reason posited for this is that where 
the doctrine, reports or articles on influence, IA or 
IO refer to such high-level topics, the terms may be 
covered by the over-simplistic catch-all of ‘culture’ 
as well as being tacitly implied within subordinate 
frameworks such as: TAA (target audience analysis); 
PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, 
infrastructure, information systems, physical 
environment and time), ASCOPE (areas, social 
structure, capabilities, organisation, people 
and events), STEMPLES (social, technological, 
environmental, military, political, legal, economic, 
security) or PESTEL (political, economic, social, 
technological, environmental and legal). Therefore, 
the aim of this article is to explicitly highlight topics 
such as heritage, iconoclasm, narratives and socio-
political timing (HINT), and discuss them in relation 
to a strategy-level framework for understanding 
influence pathways.
12. The Telegraph, ‘Turkish Bombing Damages 3,000-Year-Old Temple in Northern Syria’, 29 January 2018.
Cultural Heritage
In January 2018, a Turkish airstrike destroyed much 
of the 3,000-year-old temple of Ain Dara during 
an attack on the Kurdish-held area of Afrin, in 
northwest Syria, 30 kilometres south of the Turkish 
border.12 The temple is an important piece of late 
Bronze Age and Iron Age religious architecture 
and is one of the largest and most extensively 
excavated ancient structures in Syria. Famous for its 
intricate stone sculptures, the temple is protected 
under international law (as both Turkey and Syria 
are signatories to the 1954 Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict), but it was either deliberately 
targeted or was the victim of collateral damage 
by Turkish air forces during the offensive to sever 
Kurdish fighters’ access to the Turkish border. 
The irreversible damage at Ain Dara is yet another 
episode in the tragedy of the targeted destruction of 
standing archaeological remains at places such as the 
Mar Elian Monastery in Syria, and Nineveh in Iraq, 
as well as the frenzied and systematic iconoclasm 
and looting at Iraq’s Mosul Museum between 2014 








0 0 11 0 1
US FM 3-13
Inform and Influence 
(2013)
0 0 10 0 18
UK JDN 4/13
Culture and Human 
Terrain (2013)
0 0 5 0 155
UK JDP 04
Understanding (2010)
0 0 27 0 32
Table 1: Mentions of Key Terms Within Relevant Military Doctrine
*Relates to political zeitgeist (of the moment) rather than the timing of military planning activities.
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and early 2018, which brought cultural heritage back 
to the centre stage of modern armed conflict.
Cultural heritage, as defined by the UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), comprises the legacy of physical 
artefacts and intangible attributes of a group or 
society that are inherited from past generations, 
maintained in the present and bestowed for the 
benefit of future generations. Examples of tangible 
artefacts include buildings, monuments, literature 
and art, while intangible examples include folklore, 
traditions, language and knowledge. One can also 
include semiotics as part of heritage because it is 
the study of signs, symbols and their meanings, 
which is highly relevant to heritage.13 In October 
2016, the UN special rapporteur in the field of 
cultural rights asserted that cultural heritage is a 
human rights issue which requires a human rights 
approach. Beyond safeguarding a cultural object or 
historic building, such an approach obliges actors 
to take into account the rights of individuals and 
populations in relation to them; it is impossible 
to separate a people’s cultural heritage from the 
people themselves and their rights.14 
The weaponisation of cultural heritage is not a 
new phenomenon and conflict is rarely kind to art 
and antiquities. However, while Ahmad Al-Faqi 
Al-Mahdi’s destruction of nine mausoleums and a 
mosque at Timbuktu in Mali in 2012 was a recognised 
tool of war and prosecuted as a war crime, state 
actors have conversely sought to preserve, promote, 
restore or simply invent cultural heritage in order to 
legitimise their actions.
An example of a preserved heritage is falconry in 
the Gulf Arab states. In 2010, the UAE led an initiative 
to have falconry registered under UNESCO’s list of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage.15 Forming part of a 
romanticisation of the Arabian Peninsula’s Bedouin 
past, falconry is described as a heritage sport but, 
13. Daniel Chandler, Semiotics, the Basics (London: Routledge, 2017).
14. Karima Bennoune, ‘Karima Bennoune: Cultural Heritage is a Human Rights Issue’, UNESCO, 25 October 2016, 
<https://en.unesco.org/news/karima-bennoune-cultural-heritage-human-rights-issue>, accessed 21 February 2019.
15. Gulf News, ‘UNESCO Registers Falconry as a Live Human Heritage’, 18 November 2010.
16. Natalie Koch, ‘Gulf Nationalism and Invented Traditions’, memo presented as part of a workshop by the LSE Middle 
East Centre, 13 June 2018, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/08/03/gulf-nationalism-and-invented-traditions/>, accessed 
21 February 2019.
17. Ibid.
18. Paul A Goble, ‘Russia was and Remains a “Prison of Nations”, Moscow Writer Says’, Euromaidan Press, 4 July 2016, 
<http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/07/04/russia-was-and-remains-a-prison-house-of-nations-moscow-writer-says/>, 
accessed 16 June 2019.
19. Keir Giles, review of ‘Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020’, NATO Defence College Research Division, pp. 7–8.
20. Mikhail Suslov, ‘“Russian World” Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of “Spheres of Influence”’, 
Geopolitics (Vol. 23, No. 2, January 2018), pp. 330–53.
21. Giles, review of ‘Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020’, p. 7.
in contrast to their Bedouin ancestors, today’s 
falconers in the Arabian Peninsula understand it as 
a distinctly elite sport where some birds have cost 
over $80,000.16 The efforts to promote falconry 
have been part of a recent geopolitical trend to 
preserve and embrace heritage across the region 
where Arab falconry normalises the idea that only 
Gulf citizens belong on the Arabian Peninsula, 
as opposed to everyone else in the region who 
cannot claim falconry as their heritage or as part of 
their cultural identity.17 The heritage of falconry is 
therefore being used within a nationalist narrative 
about who truly belongs in the Arabian Peninsula. 
In contrast, Russia is actively promoting 
cultural heritage as a means to achieve national 
security. The trend of the Kremlin’s tilt towards 
anti-Western nationalism increased after massive 
protests against Vladimir Putin’s third election in 
2012 – the so-called Snow Revolution – which, 
some have argued, has turned Russia into a colonial 
prison of nations that takes a hardline approach 
to assimilating national minorities.18 As a result of 
this, Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020 
addresses culture in two ways – domestically and 
externally.19 Domestically, there is recognition that 
social cohesion is improved by fostering the cultural 
unity of the federation’s multi-ethnic peoples, while 
simultaneously resisting the historic cultural needs 
of ‘marginal strata’ (who are viewed as a threat to 
security in the cultural space). Externally, there is 
a will to use Russia’s cultural potential to reach out 
to the ‘near abroad’, the international diaspora as 
part of the ‘Russian world’,20 as well as in support of 
multilateral international cooperation.21 
Maritime archaeology may seem an unlikely 
vehicle for claims of sovereignty, but there is 
evidence that China is promoting underwater cultural 
research to strengthen claims to disputed areas in 
the South China Sea. Since at least 2013, China 
Dangerous Liaisons
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has been conducting underwater archaeological 
operations in the Spratley Island chain which it 
disputes with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Taiwan.22 Coupled with this, Chinese maritime units 
are enforcing the protection of underwater cultural 
sites by chasing away ‘unauthorized’ investigations 
in China’s claimed waters.23 As such, China is using 
underwater archaeology as a means to strengthen 
its historical claims within the nine-dash line in 
the South China Sea. Another Chinese strategy to 
illustrate the promotion of cultural heritage is the 
restoration at the Angkor Archaeological Park in 
northern Cambodia, one of the most important 
archaeological sites in Southeast Asia, which has 
led to direct financial investment and military 
cooperation with China (such as the Golden Dragon 
joint exercise held in March 2019).24 The park is 
a World Heritage Site and contains the remains 
of several capitals of the Khmer Empire. In 1992, 
the site was identified as being in danger due to 
damage and structural instability. The International 
Coordinating Committee for the Safeguarding 
and Development of the Historic Site of Angkor 
(ICC-Angkor) was organised a year later by the 
UNESCO framework.25 China, one of the members of 
ICC-Angkor, has since participated in international 
projects to help Cambodia preserve the historic 
ruins. Together with local officials, Chinese experts 
have spent eight years restoring the Ta Keo Temple 
– one of the most culturally representative buildings 
at the complex.26 Restoration was completed 
in September 2018 as a way to celebrate both 
the 25th anniversary of ICC-Angkor and the 60th 
anniversary of diplomatic relations between China 
and Cambodia. Both governments recognise that 
the Angkor ruins are a part of Cambodian identity 
and that ‘cultural tourism’ is a vital source of income 
22. Andrew S Erikson and Kevin Bond, ‘Archaeology and the South China Sea’, The Diplomat, 20 July 2015.
23. Ibid.
24. Mao Pengfei and Li Jiansu, ‘China, Cambodia Kick off Golden Dragon-2019 Joint Military Exercise’, 16 March 2019, 
China Defence Blog, <https://china-defense.blogspot.com/2019/03/china-cambodia-kick-off-golden-dragon.html>, 
accessed 16 June 2019.
25. China Daily, ‘China Helps Others Restore Heritage Sites’, 12 September 2018, available at The Nation, <http://www.
nationmultimedia.com/detail/asean-plus/30354277>, accessed 21 February 2019.
26. Ibid.
27. World Bank Group, (2017) World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update October 2017: Balancing Act (Washington 
DC: World Bank Publications, 2017), p. 91.
28. GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Cambodia - China Relations’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cambodia/forrel-prc.
htm>, accessed 21 February 2019.
29. David Hutt, ‘How China Came to Dominate Cambodia’, The Diplomat, 1 September 2016.
30. Colin Woodward, ‘The Mystery of Bosnia’s Ancient Pyramids’, Smithsonian Magazine, December 2009.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
for many; after textiles, tourism is Cambodia’s most 
important industry, providing 28% of Cambodia’s 
GDP and 25% of employment (in 2017).27 As US 
influence in the region weakens, the two countries 
are forming ever-closer ties – China has stepped 
in to provide billions of dollars in loans and 
new infrastructure projects, receiving in return 
diplomatic support for its quest for dominance in 
the South China Sea region.28 The two countries 
also formed closer military ties and strategic 
partnerships following a 15-day joint exercise in 
central Cambodia in March 2018. The restoration 
of elements of Cambodia’s cultural heritage by 
China has opened the way for the Khmer nation to 
become a client state of Beijing.29 
Alternatively, the ‘Bosnian pyramid complex’ 
provides a useful case study of completely invented 
heritage. Since 2005, a Bosnian businessman has 
claimed that a cluster of natural hills in central 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the predominantly 
Bosniak region of Visoko, is the largest human-
made ancient pyramids on Earth, providing 
evidence of a once-great civilisation.30 The claims 
have been overwhelmingly refuted by experts, but 
the businessman continues to promote the area as a 
tourist attraction. Excavations in 2006 reshaped one 
of the hills, making it look like a stepped pyramid. 
Archaeologists have condemned the work as a hoax 
and are concerned about damage being done to 
the layers of genuine cultural heritage.31 However, 
the increased tourist footfall associated with the 
‘complex’ has aided the economy of the region, 
located near the former front line of the war that 
destroyed so much of the country between 1992 and 
1995, and many scholars have noted that the claims 
have been used for serious ideological, political and 
economic gains by various factions in Bosnia.32 At 
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least one prime minister and two presidents,33 and 
many Bosnian news outlets, have welcomed the 
theory which appeals to Bosnian nationalists at a 
time of continuing economic and social difficulties 
since the war. Those in Bosnia who have attempted 
to expose the project as a nationalist hoax have 
been accused of being anti-Bosnian.34 
For state actors, cultural heritage has, to a 
greater or lesser extent, been weaponised as a 
component of a hybrid warfare campaign. Russia, 
for example, has projected state cultural policies 
to gain ideological influence and extend cultural 
soft power as part of a hybrid (or full-spectrum) 
approach, initially in Crimea, then in eastern 
Ukraine, and latterly in Syria.35 In Ukraine, tangible 
cultural heritage has been used as a proxy for the 
protection of the cultural identity of ethnic Russians 
while increased recruitment into far-right volunteer 
battalions, such as the Azov Battalion which forms 
part of the military reserve of the National Guard of 
Ukraine, has coalesced around notions of identity 
and intangible cultural heritage. These groups 
comprise ethnic nationalists who wish to bring 
the fight to Kiev, while the erosion of the cultural 
identity of some Muslim communities has also been 
witnessed.36 At the same time, and as means to 
create a new heritage narrative, the annexation of 
Crimea by Russia has seen the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church specifically targeted; individual churches 
have been singled out and looted with only those 
demonstrating fealty to Moscow enjoying religious 
freedom.37 
Folklore is linked to cultural heritage by the 
UNESCO definition as previously cited, and as an 
intangible attribute of cultural heritage. It is worth 
briefly mentioning in this article because it is also 
subject to preservation, restoration and invention, 
as well as undermining and repurposing through 
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. 
35. Mark Dunkley, ‘The Russian Weaponization of Cultural Heritage’, British Army Review, forthcoming.
36. Ibid. 
37. Tony Wesolowsky, ‘Struggling To Believe: Ukrainian Orthodox Church Under Pressure in Crimea’, 18 April 2018, Radio Free 
Europe, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-struggling-to-believe-ukrainian-orthodox-church-in-crimea-struggles-
to-survive/29175307.html>, accessed 16 June 2019.
38. Regina F Bendix and Galit Hasan-Rokem (eds), A Companion to Folklore (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, 2012).
39. Jessika Aguilar, ‘Folklore and the Construction of National Identity in Nineteenth Century Russian Literature’, PhD thesis, 
Colombia University, 2015. 
40. Ekaterina Khodzhaeva et al., ‘Mobilizing Patriotism in Russia’, Russian Analytical Digest (Vol. 207, 26 September 2017).
41. Stevan Bozanich, ‘Masculinity and Mobilised Folklore: The Image of the Hajduk in the Creation of the Modern Serbian 
Warrior’, MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013. 
42. Felix J Oinas, ‘Folklore and Politics in the Soviet Union’, Slavic Review (Vol. 32, No. 1, March 1973), pp. 45–58.
43. Dorothy Noyes, ‘The Social Base of Folklore’, in Bendix and Hasan-Rokem (eds), A Companion to Folklore, pp. 13–14.
44. Wendy Reich, ‘The Uses of Folklore in Revitalization Movements’, Folklore (Vol. 82, No. 3, Autumn 1971), pp. 233–44.
a form of cultural iconoclasm. Folklore can be 
broadly described as the traditional, yet dynamic, 
expressive culture of an ethnic and cultural group 
through informal person-to-person means. The 
methods of expressive culture are myriad and can 
relate to words, beliefs and objects (including signs 
and symbols, or semiotics) as projected through 
songs, jokes, poetry, music, legends, superstitions 
and tales.38
Folklore can be used to provide legitimacy and 
to mobilise people, cognitively and physically. For 
example, it was used in the construction of national 
identity in 19th century Russian literature,39 and has 
been assessed to contribute to the mobilisation of 
Russian cultural identity both at home40 and abroad 
(both the ‘near abroad’ and the ‘Russian world’). 
Between 1991 and 1995 as part of the Yugoslav 
Wars, the heroic Serbian warrior tradition, the 
hajduk, was used to construct perpetrator and 
victim identities, and to help encourage and justify 
the levels of violence.41 Folklore can be co-opted 
for political purposes,42 whereby politicians exploit 
the currency of nostalgic fantasy, ergo: ‘politicians, 
both national and local, project [folklore] upon the 
territories they propose to govern’. ‘Nationalist, 
populist, revolutionary, and colonialist scholars … 
produce cultural objects in the hope of modeling 
social futures’.43 Folklore is also used for revitalising 
movements44 (whether they be social, political or 
socio-political) and this is evident in the revitalisation 
of Russian national identity in geopolitics. 
Tangible and intangible cultural heritage is 
therefore being weaponised in three principal ways. 
First, public diplomacy and soft power are being 
employed through the preservation and restoration 
of heritage. Second, cultural heritage is being 
weaponised by extending the media influence of 
national and international state-owned, -funded 
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and -directed media networks that may be required 
to promote constructions of heritage or invent 
plausible cultural heritage with links to folklore. 
Finally, it is being weaponised by the protection of 
compatriots in the near abroad and wider diaspora, 
including access to appropriate cultural, ideological 
and patriotic information and education, which 
has been enforced through the application of 
hard(er) power – this is used to promote particular 
constructions of a given cultural heritage.
Current trends indicate an escalation in the 
weaponisation of heritage, both in terms of 
destruction and preservation as part of long-term 
national strategies and geopolitics. Heritage is also 
a fundamental resource for certain human rights 
including the rights to freedom of expression, 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as 
well as the economic rights of the many people 
who earn a living through heritage-related tourism. 
Cultural heritage can also play a part in post-conflict 
stabilisation and the re-establishment of normalcy. 
The familiarity of local cultural assets provides an 
important part of social infrastructure and one that 
is often overlooked when faced with other pressing 
humanitarian needs. In this way, cultural heritage 
can, where used appropriately and sensitively, help 
people find home again.
45. Michael Fallon, speech given at the RUSI Landwarfare Conference, 28 June 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/rusi-landwarfare-conference>, accessed 16 June 2019. 
46. Stacy Boldrick and Richard Clay (eds), Iconoclasm: Contested Objects, Contested Terms (Abingdon: Ashgate, 2007), p. 8.
Iconoclasm
The second contributing factor to the framework 
relates to the use of iconoclasm by state and non-
state actors to alter or destroy elements of competing 
heritages. In contemporary geopolitics, iconoclasm 
can be seen to play a role in what is often referred 
to as the era of ‘constant competition’.45 The 
etymological basis of the term ‘iconoclasm’ literally 
means ‘image breaking’46 and was historically 
focused on the physical destruction of religious 
objects: sculptures; paintings; artefacts; and other 
material. A central thesis within iconoclasm is that 
objects and material point to meanings, which 
speak to the sacred or transcendent values of a 
particular group or culture (that is, symbolism). 
Therefore, iconoclasm seeks to damage an object’s 
materiality, meaning and legitimacy. It must also be 
deliberate and intended.
However, iconoclasm is not only about 
destruction. Iconoclasm can be viewed as a 
multidimensional construct along two axes 
(Table 2). The first axis refers to levels of destruction 
and covers iconoclastic activity that ranges between 
irreversible loss of physical integrity (that is, 
destruction or damnatio memoriae) and alteration, 





• Disfiguring, damaging, 
sabotaging
• Theft, hiding, burial




• Not applicable • Repurposing/redefinition
• Acquiring / taking custody of
• Disinformation (positive 
narrative)
Table 2: Forms of Iconoclasm
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and redefinition. The second axis refers to the 
iconoclast’s intent and ranges between the intent 
to harm (malevolent iconoclasm) and the intent to 
preserve (benevolent iconoclasm).47  
Examples of these extremes include the 
rather hard-lined damnatio memoriae or the 
‘condemnation of memory’, which seeks to 
eradicate a person from history and was particularly 
favoured by the Romans as a way to discredit and 
dishonour somebody. All signs of one’s existence 
were removed from texts, paintings, statues and 
money. Extreme scenarios included the slaughter 
of the person’s staff and supporters, as happened 
to the 3rd century Roman Emperor Septimius Geta 
Augustus, where it is estimated that 20,000 of 
Geta’s staff were murdered and his memory nearly 
eradicated from history by his brother Caracalla.48 
The more subtle forms of iconoclasm (that is, soft 
malevolent or hard benevolent) can be viewed as 
‘draining away’ meaning.49 This includes tactics 
such as ‘re-purposing’ – for example, building 
Christian churches on pagan sites, which is a form 
of destruction by restoration, and increasingly, the 
use of disinformation (the deliberate dissemination 
of false information with the deliberate intent to 
deceive or mislead).50 Disinformation can be seen 
as a form of ‘information iconoclasm’ because, by 
its nature, it seeks to alter the representation and 
meaning of an image or text, as well as destroying 
competing information’s value and position within 
the contemporary digital information space; this is 
also known as ‘deepfake’.51
In recent armed conflict, the use of iconoclasm 
endures: for example, the destruction of the 
Buddhas of Bamyan in 2001 by the Afghan Taliban; 
the looting and destruction of the ancient site at 
Palmyra in 2015 by Daesh (also known as the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS); and, as mentioned 
earlier, the Turkish airstrike on the temple of Ain 
Dara in 2018, as well as the targeted destruction of 
47. Fabio Rambelli and Eric Reinders, ‘What Does Iconoclasm Create? What Does Preservation Destroy? Reflections on 
Iconoclasm in East Asia’, in Boldrick and Clay (eds), Iconoclasm.
48. Eric R Varner, Mutilation and Transformation: Damnatio Memoriae and Roman Imperial Portraiture (Leiden: Brill, 
2004), pp. 168–84.
49. Ibid. 
50. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Digital Hydra: Security Implications of False Information Online 
(Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2017).
51. Alan Zucconi, ‘An Introduction to Deepfakes’, 14 March 2018, <https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/03/14/introduction-to-
deepfakes/>, accessed 16 June 2018.
52. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission to Cox’s 
Bazar, Bangladesh’, 13–24 September 2017, p. 1.
53. BBC News, ‘Bulgaria Soviet Monument in Sofia Gets Ukraine Twist’, 25 February 2014. 
54. BBC News, ‘Violence at May Day Protest’, 1 May 2000. 
the Mar Elian Monastery in Syria, and Nineveh in 
Iraq. In Myanmar the military government has been 
accused of conducting damnatio memoriae against 
the Rohingya – a 2017 report by the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights suggested 
that the government was attempting to ‘effectively 
erase all signs of memorable landmarks in the 
geography of the Rohingya landscape and memory 
in such a way that a return to their lands would yield 
nothing but a desolate and unrecognizable terrain’.52 
Iconoclasm has also played a role in recent 
resistance movements: for example, as part of 
the Arab uprisings in 2011, the ‘Egyptian Mount 
Rushmore’, a series of statues on the outskirts of 
Cairo, was defaced and damaged after the arrest 
of President Hosni Mubarak and the Soviet Army 
monument in Sofia has been the focus of attention on 
several occasions (Figure 1). In 2012 the depictions 
of soldiers were turned into ones of Superman, 
Santa Claus and other comic book characters. 
In 2013, activists painted the monument pink to 
apologise for the support that Bulgarian soldiers 
gave to the Soviet Union when it suppressed the 
Prague Spring in 1968, and in 2014 the monument 
was painted with the colours of the Ukrainian flag as 
a protest against Russian interventions in Ukrainian 
political affairs. It has even received a ‘Pussy Riot’ 
makeover to bring attention to the anti-Putin band 
and its harassment.53
However, recent iconoclasm does not just 
relate to ‘them’. The US Army helped Baghdad 
locals with the symbolic tearing down of a Saddam 
Hussein statue in Firdos Square in 2003, and also 
demolished a bronze statue of a mounted Saddam 
Hussein in his hometown of Tirkrit. In 2000 a 
student defaced the statue of Winston Churchill 
in Central London during May Day riots, which 
for a short time afterwards caused outrage in the 
British press.54 One interesting piece of subtle 
and benevolent iconoclasm sits in Horse Guards 
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Figure 1: Transformations of the Monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia
Source: Original images, in order from top to bottom, courtesy of Spiritia/Wikimedia Commons; Ignat Ignev/Wikimedia 
Commons; Ignat Ignev/Wikimedia Commons; Ferran Cornellà/Wikimedia Commons.
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Parade in London. The ‘Turkish Gun’ was made in 
1524 and captured by the British in Egypt in 1801.55 
The visual aesthetics of the gun appear to show an 
ornate Turkish cannon sitting on its carriage, but 
closer inspection uncovers the fact that the wheel 
and trail of the gun carriage are of British design and 
were ‘constructed in the Royal Carriage department 
founded by J&E Hall, Dartford’.56 The hubs on the 
wheels display the heads of British lions and the trail 
is adorned with British military coats of arms, along 
with figures of Britannia reclining on her shield next 
to a lion while pointing at the Egyptian pyramids. 
Therefore, the only part of the gun that is Turkish 
is the barrel.
Additionally, the airbrushing of history has 
gained socio-political popularity in the West: for 
example, the removal of Confederate statues in the 
US as well as the defacing and removal of colonial 
statues, such as Cecil Rhodes, which began at 
the University of Cape Town in 2015 and spread 
through an online campaign (#RhodesMustFall) to 
reach international universities. Regardless of the 
socio-political motivations and reasoning for such 
campaigns, these are still acts of iconoclasm.
Laws can also be used as a legitimate means 
of conducting iconoclasm, in that they can 
simultaneously preserve one’s own heritage and 
curtail one’s opponent’s. The use of legal means 
to preserve preferred heritage (benevolent) and 
conduct iconoclasm (malevolent) is not new: for 
example, in 1643 during the English Civil War 
William Dowsing was appointed ‘Commissioner 
for the destruction of monuments of idolatry and 
superstition’.57 Skip forward almost 400 years and 
the use of law is also being exploited in Russia with 
55. London Remembers, ‘Memorial: Turkish Gun’, <https://www.londonremembers.com/memorials/turkish-gun>, 
accessed 16 June 2018.
56. Harry Miller, Halls of Dartford, 1785–1985 (London: Hutchinson Benham, 1985). 
57. Trevor Cooper, The Journal of William Dowsing: Iconoclasm in East Anglia During the English Civil War (Woodbridge: 
Boydell Press, 2001).
58. ‘Federal Law #18-FZ, On Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation 2006 (Russia)’.
59. ‘Federal Law from the 5th of April 2016 N 95-FZ, On Introducing Amendments into Federal Law “About the Objects of 
Cultural Heritage (Monuments of History and Culture) of the Nations of the Russian Federation” and into Article 15 of the 
Federal Law “On the State Cadastre of the Real Estate / Real Property” 2016 (Russia)’.
60. ‘Federal Law from 6 July 2016 N 374-FZ, On the Introduction of Amendments to the Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism” 
and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation to Establish Additional Measures to Combat Terrorism and Ensure 
Public Safety 2016 (Russia)’ (also known as the ‘Anti-Terror Law’ or ‘Yarovaya’s Law’).
61. Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, <http://www.mkrf.ru/en/>, accessed 21 June 2019.
62. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, ‘State of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Populism – How 
Strong are Europe’s Checks and Balances?’, April 2017, p. 64.
63. Richard Stites, ‘Iconoclastic Currents in the Russian Revolution: Destroying and Preserving the Past’, in Abbott Gleason, 
Peter Kenez and Richard Stites (eds), Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 18.
the passing of several new Russian laws, including 
the non-governmental organisation law (2006),58 
monument protection zones (2016)59 and Yarovaya 
law (2016).60 There have also been recent proposed 
federal laws on culture and changes to taxation 
laws in order to recognise contemporary art as art, 
thereby opening up Russian art to a global market 
for internal economic benefit, but these laws have 
not yet been passed.61 The tightening of treason and 
terrorism laws has broad effects. These, such as the 
Yarovaya law: reduce religious freedom; supress 
freedom of expression, assembly and association; 
curtail political opposition and campaigning; 
and reduce information freedom through wider 
surveillance and tighter online control.62 Russia is 
no worse or better at iconoclasm than any other 
nation throughout history. However, the last 100 
years of political turmoil in Russia have witnessed 
iconoclasm used in a continuous cycle for post-
Tsarist, post-Leninist, post-Stalinist and post-
Soviet purposes. This has led some to suggest that 
‘iconoclasm seems so very Russian’.63 When viewed 
holistically, these legal changes serve a dual purpose 
of simultaneously preserving preferred heritage 
(Russian nationalism) while stymying undesired 
cultural change (Western influence) and could be 
viewed as a form of ‘pre-clasm’, that is, activities 
based on proactive prevention rather than reactive 
destruction, which again, gives intimation towards a 
strategy for influencing. 
In summary, these various forms of iconoclasm 
point to the emergence of a broader transdisciplinary 
approach for studying iconoclasm. This is especially 
the case in a digital age, where images and words 
mean so much – therefore, if one changes the 
Dangerous Liaisons
62 © Crown copyright April 2019
context, one may also change the meaning.64 
Iconoclasm still plays a part in contemporary 
conflict, as well as regional politics and geopolitics. 
The traditional form of iconoclasm as destruction is 
still evident, but the world is watching more closely 
than ever. Therefore, nuanced forms of iconoclasm 
are emerging as nation states seek subtler ways of 
changing or removing the value and meaning of 
competing heritage and cultural identity in an era of 
constant competition.
Narratives
The penultimate factor in the framework relates 
to the use of compelling and powerful stories in 
order to promote heritage and conduct iconoclasm. 
Narratives are part of storytelling, and storytelling is 
part of human evolution and the oral tradition. This 
is suitably captured by Brian Alleyne: 
Narrative is ubiquitous to the human. It makes us 
human as well as being made by humans. The human 
is a storytelling creature. The passage of time shapes 
and is shaped by narrative, but how time is conceived 
varies socially and culturally. The creation and retelling 
of stories is found across societies and cultures.65
The classical narrative structure of storytelling 
refers to the three-part framework of start–middle–
end and reflects the basics of essay composition as 
taught in schools. This three-act structure is often 
attributed to Aristotle’s Poetics66 which introduces 
the concept of balance–imbalance–balance, 
possibly as a way of resolving psychological and 
social tension invoked by the emotional mechanisms 
that underpin the act of, and the reaction to, 
storytelling. The academic study of narratives is 
known as ‘narratology’ and has spawned a number 
of academic journals, research centres and annual 
conferences; and there are recognised structural 
64. Megan E O’Neil et al., ‘The New Iconoclasm’, Material Religion: The Journal of Objects, Art and Belief (Vol. 10, No. 3, 
September 2014), pp. 377–85. 
65. Brian Alleyne, Narrative Networks: Storied Approaches in a Digital Age (London: SAGE, 2014), p. 1.
66. Aristotle, Poetics, translation, introduction and notes by Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
67. Alleyne, Narrative Networks.
68. Raymond A Mar, ‘The Neuropsychology of Narrative: Story Comprehension, Story Production and Their Interrelation’, 
Neuropsychologia (Vol. 42, No. 10, 2004), pp. 1414–34; Paul J Zak, ‘Why Inspiring Stories Make Us React: The Neuroscience 
of Narrative’, Cerebrum ( January/February 2015), pp. 1–15.
69. Melanie C Green and Timothy C Brock, ‘The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 79, No. 5, November 2000), p. 704.
70. Frederick Luis Aldama, ‘The Science of Storytelling: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and the 
Humanities’, Projections (Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015), pp. 80–95; Veerle Ros and Miklos Kiss, ‘Disrupted PECMA Flows: A Cognitive 
Approach to the Experience of Narrative Complexity in Film’, Projections (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2018), pp. 71–96.
71. Rorkesdriftvc.com, ‘Popular Myths’, <http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/myths/myths.htm>, accessed 20 September 2018.
analyses for conceptualising the building blocks of 
narrative structure:67 for example, Vladimir Propp’s 
Character Theory, Tzvetan Todorov’s Equilibrium 
Theory, Gustav Freytag’s Pyramid, Roland Barthes’s 
Hermeneutic Code, William Labov and Joshua 
Waletzky’s Narrative Clause, and Joseph Campbell’s 
Hero’s Journey. 
The scientific study of narratives has improved 
over time, especially with the contribution 
of neuroscience.68 The concept of narrative 
‘transportation’ has been described as ‘immersion 
or absorption into a narrative world’ and research 
experiments have been conducted in order to 
closely study this phenomenon.69 Transportation 
is a way of understanding how humans become 
emotionally and psycho-physiologically engrossed 
into a story. The best moviemakers understand 
transportation very well because they optimise the 
psychophysiological arousal mechanisms in humans 
through the combined use of image, word and 
sound to emotionally transport the viewer, thereby 
providing the viewer with a stronger and better 
experience, which is encoded into memory.70
History is replete with 
narratives that may be less 
accurate or ‘true’ than some 
might assume
While it is accepted that narratives can extol 
a hegemonic tone and exert powerful feelings, 
this does not necessarily mean that historical or 
entrenched narratives need to be accurate or true. 
History is replete with narratives that may be less 
accurate or ‘true’ than some might assume. For 
example, it is assessed from historical research 
that the complement of Welshmen at the Battle of 
Rorke’s Drift in 1879 was only about 20% Welsh,71 
Verrall et al.
63
whereas the common assumption (reinforced 
by the famous 1964 film Zulu) is that they were a 
unit that was predominantly Welsh. Although the 
regimental depot had been established at Brecon, 
South Wales, in 1873, the county designation of the 
24th Regiment in 1879 was the 2nd Warwickshires, 
who recruited from all over the UK, and they did 
not change their title to the South Wales Borderers 
until 1 July 1881, almost exactly two years after the 
Anglo-Zulu war had ended. Independence Day in 
the US is celebrated on 4 July annually; however, 
the vote by Congress was on 2 July 1776. Similarly, 
the UK voted to leave the EU on 23 June 2016 but 
its final leaving date is yet to play out; therefore, it 
will be interesting to see how history treats these 
dates and the associated narratives. In this way 
history can act as a form of false memory syndrome 
or self-deception because identifying with a 
powerful and compelling narrative fulfils one’s 
desire for what one wants to feel true (emotions 
and feelings) rather than objectively assessing what 
one knows to be true (fact and truth). This is a form 
of cognitive dissonance where disinformation and 
misinformation can manifest through psychological 
mechanisms such as groupthink, confirmation bias 
and belief bias. Therefore, heritage can be exploited 
and iconoclasm can be maximised through the use 
of powerful and compelling narratives that may 
be less than completely accurate and honest, or 
complete fabrication.
Within a military context, the idea of narrative-
led operations72 has been gaining traction in recent 
72. Thomas Elkjer Nissen, ‘Narrative Led Operations’, Militært Tidsskrift [Danish Military Journal] (Vol. 141, No. 4, January 
2013), pp. 67–77.
73. Kathryn Tomlinson, ‘Profiling and Influence Analysis: Storytelling for Change’, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, 
DSTL/TR34113, 2009; David Betz and Vaughan Phillips, ‘Putting the Strategy back into Strategic Communications’, Defence 
Strategic Communications (Vol. 3, Autumn 2017), pp. 41–70.
74. The origin of the term ‘soft power’ is equivocal and has been attributed to both Joseph S Nye, Jr and Suzanne Nossel 
between 2003 and 2004.
75. Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power’, 
Media, War & Conflict (Vol. 7, No. 1, 2014), pp. 70–84.
76. Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, ‘Broad Agency Announcement 18-S-3001’, 4 January 2018.
77. Christina Meyer, ‘Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru’, RAND Note, RAND, 1991.
78. Jyrki Kallio, ‘Towards China’s Strategic Narrative: On the Construction of the Historico-Cultural Roots of China’s National 
Identity in the Light of the Chinese Debate Relating to the Rise of Traditional Schools of Thought’, dissertation, University 
of Lapland, November 2016.
79. Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric World’, 
Politics and Governance (Vol. 5, No. 3, September 2017), pp. 111–20.
80. Ants Laaneots, The Russian-Georgian War of 2008: Causes and Implication, ENDC Occasional Papers 4/2016 (Tartu: Eesti 
Ülikoolide Kirjastus, 2016), pp. 1–108.
81. Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders and Daniel Antoun, ‘Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia’s Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the 
Former Soviet Union’, Center for Naval Analyses, November 2015.
82. Todd C Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2018). 
years as it becomes increasingly recognised that 
narratives can help the military to understand and 
shape operations in complex conflict environments,73 
especially in an era of constant competition. The 
concept of a ‘strategic narrative’ can be used not 
just for national steerage as part of soft power,74 but 
also for defence engagement at the strategic level of 
the military.75 The US Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency spent between $20 million and 
$30 million on its Narrative Networks Program 
2012–16, which aimed to understand the 
underpinning neuroscience as to why narratives 
resonate with humans. Its main aim was to support 
the study of post-traumatic stress disorder in 
injured military personnel and veterans, but the 
study has broader application to the influence 
domain. Additionally, the US Combating Terrorism 
Technical Support Office is currently funding work 
into identifying and countering non-autonomous 
disinformation efforts as part of its irregular warfare 
programme. This research seeks to determine how, 
where and why adversary narratives reach and 
influence online.76
Analyses and lessons from influence activities 
by other states show that stories and narrative play 
an important part in their strategy: for example, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru,77 and China.78 Russia 
is particularly steeped in the folklore and storytelling 
genre and several analyses have looked at how Russia 
uses narrative for global means,79 regional means,80 
to mobilise compatriots,81 how it delivers narrative 
via social media82 and how narratives form part of 
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long-term strategy delivered through various agents 
of influence (both knowingly and unwittingly).83 By 
looking at the Western military’s own effects-based 
language, effects terms can be identified that may 
be part of an adversary’s influence objectives: for 
example, compel; convince; encourage; deceive; 
deter; discredit; empower; frighten; harass; induce; 
manipulate; mislead; prevent; protect; reassure; 
shape; and undermine. Therefore, it should be 
evident that heritage (physical and intangible) and 
iconoclasm can be used for political, social and 
cultural change, and that this is achieved through 
compelling stories and narratives that emotionally 
transport and influence the target audience.  
Socio-Political Timing
From its first incarnation in Ireland in the 1790s 
through to today, Irish Republicanism has looked 
to Ireland’s rich mythology to sustain and promote 
its cause. For many in the republican movement, 
Irish mythology embodies the movement’s spirit 
and fortifies them in their struggle. It raises and 
embellishes both mythical and historical figures to 
support its political aspirations and adopts media, 
be it poetry, literature, drama or social media, to 
promulgate its message. Its strength is seen in words 
that promote deeds, belief and actions. Republican 
ideals and powerful rhetoric cannot be separated in 
this context and it is a heady mix which motivates 
people to acts of violence and political activity 
in equal measure. This is being ‘refreshed’ in the 
contemporary social and digital climate where 
images and identity are being weaponised alongside 
words and narrative.
The Celtic wondertales are based on four cycles: 
the Mythological Cycle; the Ulster Cycle; the Fenian 
Cycle; and the Historical Cycle.84 These cycles 
contain tales of great heroes engaging in fantastical 
acts, but at their core is the theme of resistance 
against invaders and oppression. 
The Mythological Cycle is the least well 
preserved of the four cycles and establishes 
the stories of the gods and the origins of the 
Irish. It begins the tales of the Irish struggle for 
83. Vladimir Sazonov, Kristiina Müür and Igor Kopõtin, ‘Methods and Tools of Russian Information Operations Used Against 
Ukrainian Armed Forces: The Assessments of Ukrainian Experts’, ENDC Occasional Papers (Vol. 6, 2017), pp. 52–66.
84. Frank Delaney, Legends of the Celts (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1991).
85. Lesa Ní Mhunghaile, ‘Ossian and the Gaelic World’, in Dafydd Moore (ed.), The International Companion to James 
Macpherson and the Poems of Ossian (Glasgow: Scottish Literature International, 2017).
86. Robert Kee, The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism (London: Penguin, Books, 2000).
87. Peter Neville, ‘The Origins & Development of Irish Republicanism: Peter Neville Surveys the Growth of Republicanism in 
Ireland up to the Present Day’, History Review (Vol. 40, 2001).
independence with Lebor Gabála Érenn or Book of 
Invasions. The 1st century Ulster Cycle, based in the 
counties of Ulster and Connacht, contains arguably 
the most famous of Irish heroes, Cú Chulainn. The 
Ulster Cycle is at one level a heroic tale of friends, 
lovers and enemies but very much focuses on the 
struggles of small numbers of Irish fighting against 
overwhelming odds, with great sacrifice. For the 
republican movement this is a recurring theme. 
The 3rd century Fenian Cycle is concerned with 
the deeds of Irish heroes predominately in Leinster 
and Munster. This collection not only tells the 
tales of Irish-speaking Fionn mac Cumhaill and 
his band of soldiers, the Fianna – again reflecting 
the republican tenet of the impact of small groups 
of active resistance85 – but also the reality that the 
struggle for Irish independence is a long game. The 
final cycle, the Historical Cycle or Cycles of the 
Kings, is largely mythological, but weaves historical 
figures into it, including the legendary warrior 
Brian Boru. Its core message is one of unity, which 
resonates with contemporary republicanism. Like 
many of the ancient European wondertales, such 
as the Welsh Mabinogion, they have been subject 
to medieval rewrites and revisions over time, which 
gives a glimpse into the way in which stories and 
history are adapted at different periods in time.
The Irish Republican movement arguably began 
in 1778 with the establishment of the first Irish 
Volunteers.86 This 18th century movement gifted 
the modern republican movement its first ‘modern’ 
heroes of resistance. In 1791 the Society of United 
Irishmen was founded by Theobald Wolfe Tone and 
Thomas Russell.87 Subsequent uprisings drew on the 
cumulative ideals of the cycles and Tone, inspiring 
the 1803 Irish Rebellion, under Robert Emmet. 
Despite being considered military failures, these 
figures entered the lexicon of Irish Republicanism 
and modern Irish mythology. Indeed, failure 
and tragedy, which would have crushed many 
movements, gave strength to the republican cause. 
The 1845–49 Great Famine brought republicanism 
to the fore as a political movement and 
internationalised the cause. Migrants from Ireland 
went to the US, predominantly New York, and were 
housed in crowded ghettos where a shared sense 
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of survival and need for cultural unity drew upon 
tales from the ‘old country’ in order to influence 
a new generation of trans-Atlantic republicans. In 
1858 Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa began organising 
the Phoenix National and Literary Society in the 
US;88 with a focus on literature and the politicisation 
of wondertales, this helped to found the Fenian 
Brotherhood in the US, a powerful fundraising 
force linked to the Irish Republican Brotherhood in 
Ireland.89
Irish Republicanism has looked 
to Ireland’s rich mythology to 
sustain and promote its cause
During the 20th century republican ideology 
faced many challenges. The economy was weak 
after the famine and was heavily dependent on 
both trade and remittances from Irish workers in 
Britain.90 In addition to large-scale migration to 
both the US and Great Britain, those remaining 
were generally of low literacy and were exposed 
to British counterinsurgency activities.91 Again, the 
republican movement used the oral tradition in 
order to reach out to the diaspora. However, people 
were tired of the old heroes: they did not resonate 
with individuals’ present situation. Therefore, new 
myths were created to fill this need. The mythical 
Kathleen Ni Houlihan stepped into this role. 
Created by William Yeats and Lady Augusta Gregory 
in 1902, she came to personify Ireland to such an 
extent that many believed she was a real figure.92 
She is portrayed as a poor homeless woman who 
encourages the young men to sacrifice themselves 
to free and redeem Ireland. She became a powerful 
mother figure seeking to deliver a future Ireland 
through sacrifice in the present. 
The 1916 Easter Rising by the Provisional 
Government of the Irish Republic, Saorstát 
88. Seán Ó Lúing, trans. Patrick McWilliams, O’Donovan Rossa: An Irish Revolutionary in America (CreateSpace Independent 
Publishing Platform, 2016).
89. Shane Kenna, Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa: Unrepentant Fenian (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2015).
90. Edward J O’Boyle, ‘Classical Economics and the Great Irish Famine: A Study in Limits’, Forum for Social Economics (Vol. 35, 
No. 2, Fall 2006).
91. Frank Rynne, ‘The Great Famine in Nationalist and Land League Propaganda 1879–1882’, Mémoire(s), identité(s), 
marginalité(s) dans le monde occidental contemporain (Vol. 12, 2015).
92. Michael Cox (ed.), The Concise Oxford Chronology of English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
93. Sean Ferrell Moran, Patrick Pearse and the Politics of Redemption: The Mind of the Easter Rising, 1919 (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1997).
94. Joseph McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919–1921 ( Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 2011).
95. Cal McCarthy, Cumann na mBan and the Irish Revolution (Cork: The Collins Press, 2014).
96. Stephanie J Pocock, ‘Artistic Liminality: Yeats’s Cathleen ni Houlihan and Purgatory’, New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach 
Nua (Vol. 12, No. 3, Fómhar/Autumn 2008), pp. 99–117.
Éireann, and the Army of the Irish Republic gave the 
republican movement not only the ‘Proclamation’ 
but a new Fianna and a new set of martyrs. Patrick 
(Pádraig) Pearse was a co-author and signatory of 
the Proclamation of the Irish Republic, which was 
read out aloud on the steps of the Dublin General 
Post Office on Easter Monday, 24 April 1916. Pearse, 
a student of Irish literature, was deeply influenced 
by the Ulster Cycle of legends and myths associated 
with Cù Chulainn.93 He was acutely aware of the 
power of the press and this ‘performance’ on 
the steps was key to reaching out not only across 
Ireland’s population, but across the Atlantic. Pearse 
was executed on 3 May 1916 at Kilmainham Gaol in 
Dublin. The execution of Pearse and his compatriots 
by the British authorities added more martyrs to the 
republican cause and created a further link with the 
mythical Fianna.
The solidification within republican ranks was 
the legacy of the 1916 uprising. While heroes were 
important, the creation of small independent units, 
collective resistance, unity and loyalty became the 
dominant narrative.94 The bloody Irish Civil War split 
the country yet it reinforced the notion of gender 
equality within the republican movement, as the role 
of women in the movement transitioned from being 
supporters to fighters, with women contributing to 
the full range of roles, such as combat, logistics and 
intelligence.95 This not only addressed a shortage 
of male fighters but also supported a section of the 
proclamation, which mentions gender equality.
Following the Second World War, the republican 
movement in Ulster saw a return to the past to 
promote the cause. Just as the British Army looks 
to its history for its identity and cohesion, so did 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The spirit 
of Kathleen Ni Houlihan was once again invoked 
in a call to offer her sons to ‘the cause’.96 The 
language of the period clearly invoked not only Cú 
Chulainn but also Tone and the martyrs of 1916. 
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The resurgence of Irish Gaelic within the H-Block 
prison system among republican prisoners further 
drove their identity, separating them linguistically 
as well as ideologically from their fellow Unionist 
prison population.97 Outside of the main republican 
movement, the identity with the Republic of Ireland 
manifested itself through the flying of the Irish 
Tricolour. This was a direct challenge to the British 
state – the 1954 Flags and Emblems Act effectively 
banned the flying of the Irish tricolour in Northern 
Ireland. Again, the authorities miscalculated the 
response, and this fed into the republican psyche 
of being a victim of oppression and martyrdom. 
As the numbers of interred men increased, the 
republican movement looked to women again to 
fill its ranks. In Irish mythology women have been 
variously cast as heroes and victims. The 1916 
uprising had demonstrated the value of women 
for paramilitary undertaking, with women like 
Constance Markievicz taking leading roles in the 
fighting and being subsequently mythologised. 
Women now moved to the fore, being portrayed 
as fully part of the resistance rather than victims, 
effectively putting Kathleen Ni Hoolihan to rest.
The HINT framework also 
helps to uncover strategy and/
or stratagem
The Good Friday Agreement arguably ended 
the armed conflict in Northern Ireland; however, 
terrorist and organised crime activity undoubtedly 
continues, and republicanism has not ended. It has 
morphed and adapted into ‘social’ republicanism. It 
is now a far more female-focused movement which 
has returned to the Proclamation for its inspiration.98 
As a movement it now talks of equality, human 
rights, development and education – replacing the 
language of resistance with the language of civil 
society. Just as Kathleen Ni Hoolihan was created 
to appeal to a new base, the current incarnation 
of the republican movement is looking to the past 
to give credibility and historical provenance to 
its current policies. Gone are the images of the 
cycles, which are now replaced by Markievicz. 
Social media memes promote a vision of a free, 
equal, unified Ireland. The martyrs of the uprising 
97. Feargal Mac Ionnrachtaigh, Language, Resistance and Revival: Republican Prisoners and the Irish Language in the North 
of Ireland (London: Pluto Press, 2013).
98. Danielle Roberts, ‘“Mum-of-Two, 40”: But Women Rise to the Top in Northern Irish Politics’, Democratic Audit UK, 
4 November 2017, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/80407/1/democraticaudit.com-Mum-of-two%2040%20but%20women%20
rise%20to%20the%20top%20in%20Northern%20Irish%20politics.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2019.
and the hunger strikes have not gone entirely, but 
they have largely been eclipsed by more palatable 
and contemporary socio-political messages from 
history, which appeal to a new target audience of a 
new and different generation. Sacrifice is no longer 
portrayed as making the ultimate sacrifice; rather, a 
message that political aims are achievable through 
civil and liberal society is being pushed.
Republicanism has survived and been sustained 
by being flexible and adaptable. This requires an 
ability to spot shifts in socio-political feeling and 
makes use of adroit socio-political timing. It has 
used heritage and narrative skilfully, when the 
socio-political climate provides the opportunity 
to communicate and act. When used smartly, this 
can be a powerful motivational and recruiting tool. 
While not always successful, republicans have 
learned and adapted.
Realising the HINT Framework
Figure 2 illustrates HINT. It describes four key 
influence pathways that occur at a high level: 
what a group promotes (cultural heritage); what it 
destroys (iconoclasm); how it does it (compelling 
stories); and when it does it (socio-political timing). 
The dynamic interrelationship between these four 
factors creates a powerful framework to influence 
populations in terms of their beliefs (what they 
strongly believe), perceptions and attitudes (what 
they think), and, ultimately, behaviour (what they 
do). When laid on top of other existing frameworks 
(such as TAA, PMESII-PT, ASCOPE, STEMPLES 
or PESTEL) it acts as a useful handrail to inform 
various forms of assessments and analysis, such as 
human terrain analysis, joint effects analysis and 
intelligence assessments. 
The HINT framework also helps to uncover 
strategy and/or stratagem. Individual activities 
conducted under the constituent parts of HINT 
may appear independent and unconnected to the 
untrained or unfocused eye, but when monitored 
and analysed in concert, a pattern of interconnected 
activities and behaviours starts to uncover a strategy. 
This strategy will likely show a range of activities 
conducted by disparate disciplines and approaches, 
via multiple channels, across physical and virtual/
Verrall et al.
67
digital space and across the longer term (strategic), 
medium term (operational) and short term (tactical). 
Adopting HINT to consider strategy ‘suggests an 
ability to look up from the short term and the trivial 
to view the long term and the essential, to address 
causes rather than symptoms, to see woods rather 
than trees’.99
HINT also supports the information advantage 
doctrine.100 This doctrine refl ects the view that 
credible advantage can only be gained through 
the continuous, adaptive, decisive and resilient 
employment of information and information 
systems. This is especially the case in an era of 
constant competition, where information must 
be weaponised if it is to be used from strategic 
to tactical levels for competitive advantage. In 
support of this, the individual HINT factors 
directly contribute to two of the four pillars of the 
doctrine: (1) information as an enabler (Enhance 
Understanding); and (2) information as an eff ector 
(Behavioural Analytics). Consequently, HINT also 
seamlessly supports the army’s contribution to 
information advantage – which is its information 
99. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. ix.
100. Ministry of Defence, ‘Information Advantage’, Joint Concept Note 2/18, November 2018.
manoeuvre concept – whereby HINT also 
contributes to the four outputs of understand, 
communicate, persuade and protect throughout 
the physical, virtual and cognitive dimensions.
Finally, it should be remembered that this is 
a theoretical framework and not a scientifi cally 
proven model. It is meant to act as a handrail in order 
to help develop a better level of understanding, and 
as such it can be edited or ignored, but it is hoped 
that it can be easily remembered and used to guide 
subsequent analysis and understanding.
Implications for Fighting Power
If successfully considered, designed and delivered, 
HINT should infl uence character and behaviour 
by aff ecting will, understanding and capability. 
This undermines an opponent’s fi ghting power by 
striking at the moral component of fi ghting power 
(the will to fi ght), whereby HINT contributes to 
the demotivation of opposing forces and target 
audiences, as well as motivating one’s own force to 












Preserve, promote, restore or invent a plausible 
heritage that suits the current strategy of ideology
Iconoclasm (I)
Destroy, alter or repurpose competing heritage
Powerful Narratives (N)
Construct and tell powerful and compelling stories 
that emotionally transport the target audience
Socio-Political Timing (T)
Select the history that fits the current social and 
political climate
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fight and galvanise its own population: what works 
for one’s own forces works against those of the 
enemy, and vice versa. In reference to the human 
component of fighting power, the UK Defence 
Doctrine ( JDP 0-01) asserts that:
Fighting power may be enhanced by applying 
scientific expertise relating to the social, psychological 
and behavioural aspects of human behaviour. 
Understanding group dynamics and people’s 
motivations supports assessments of likely behaviour 
in complex situations  
… 
[w]hen assessing the situation, our commanders must 
understand the context in which they are applying 
fighting power.101
To support fighting power, JDP 0-01 identifies 
several areas that require socio-cultural and 
socio-technical understanding in order to address 
‘the vagaries of human nature’102 that shape the 
likelihood of success on operations: 
• The character of the situation.
• The environment.
• The opponent.
• Allies, partners and other agencies.
• Culture and history.
Therefore, it can be seen how HINT has a role to 
play in both influence and counter-influence; and in 
the case of Western and/or coalition operations the 
use of HINT is kept in check by legal considerations 
within the Law of Armed Conflict,103 the UNESCO 
Protection of Cultural Property Military Manual,104 
and the Rules of Engagement and Targeting Directives. 
In the counter-influence role, HINT allows firstly 
for understanding and then disruption of adversary 
efforts, especially when these efforts are false and/or 
contravene the rules-based international system.
101. Ministry of Defence, ‘UK Defence Doctrine’, JDP 0-01, 5th edition, November 2014, pp. 26–27.
102. Ibid., p. 27. 
103. Ministry of Defence, ‘The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict’, JSP 383, 2004 edition.
104. Roger O’Keefe et al., Protection of Cultural Property: Military Manual (Paris: UNESCO, 2016).
105. Eliot Higgins, ‘New Generation of Digital Detectives Fight to Keep Russia Honest’, StopFake.org, 15 July 2016. 
Conclusion
This new framework has not been created for the 
sake of it. The original idea was not to create a 
framework but simply to discuss interesting topics 
involving the will to fight; however, a framework 
emerged through debate about topics that are 
rarely considered in sufficient detail when trying 
to understand the strategies of adversaries and 
the beliefs and motivations of target audiences. 
The evidence and discussion in this article 
demonstrate that factors such as cultural heritage, 
iconoclasm and socio-political timing are as 
relevant to influence as are narratives, yet they 
are not adequately reflected in existing doctrine 
and frameworks. Thus, it is insufficient to refer 
to these factors under broad umbrella terms such 
as ‘culture’ because they involve independent 
but highly related topics through which all other 
aspects of culture and behaviour operate.
Finally, HINT also allows senior decision-
makers to expose the false or inappropriate use of 
heritage and stories, as well as acts of iconoclasm. 
This counter-activity could be enabled through the 
use of open source units and citizen analysts such as 
StopFake, Bellingcat and other ‘digital detectives’,105 
as well as established ‘in-house’ specialist units and 
intelligence analysis. Regardless of who conducts 
it, there is a requirement to broaden the skills base 
to include people from the arts and humanities 
community. This is already underway with the 
forming of the British Army’s Cultural Property 
Protection Unit and the employment of specialists 
within Specialist Group Military Intelligence, the 
Defence Cultural Specialist Unit and 77th Brigade. n
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